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CASE NOTES

employees under the contract. Terseness on the part of district court and.
absolute silence of the circuit court prohibit analysis of the nature of
the peculiar promise involved in the Jenkins case.
It is readily seen that the Virginia court has worked an implied enlargement in the scope of the term "promise." The court did so apparently
without notice of the fact or in the belief that a variation in form of a
statement of obligation is secondary in importance to its nature as a recital of liability assumed. For this reason, the decision will probably have
little weight in a jurisdiction choosing to be more analytical when called
upon to ascribe liability predicated upon a similarly constructed "understanding." Until such future judicial examination, it remains an abnormal
specie of one of the basic legal concepts, with little reason behind its
creation-a mutation in the law of contracts.
CRIMINAL LAW-MANSLAUGHTER CONVICTION FOR
FAILURE TO PROVIDE MEDICAL AID TO CHILD
BECAUSE OF RELIGIOUS BELIEF REVERSED
The defendants, husband and wife, were convicted of the crime of
involuntary manslaughter under a Maryland statute which provides that
the father and mother are jointly and severally charged with the "support, care, nurture, welfare and education of their minor children."' The
state charged that the defendants were guilty of gross negligence in not
having furnished medical attention to their deceased minor child. The
defense contended that they were conscientious believers in the Church
of God and based their belief in divine healing, and when their child
became sick they cared for it in accordance with the teachings of the
Bible, 2 and that therefore, they were not guilty of any neglect of duty
owing to their child. The court of appeals reversed and remanded the
cases for a new trial, holding that the state's evidence was not sufficient
to show that the gross negligence of the parents was the proximate cause
of the child's death. Craigv. Maryland, 155 A.2d 648 (Md., 1959).
At common law, a parent, or anyone standing in such a relationship
had the duty of furnishing necessaries to his minor unemancipated
child.3 Medical attention, when needed to preserve life or health, is
1 Md. Code (1957) Art. 72A, S 1.
2 "James says, if anyone is sick let him call for the elders of the church, and let them,
pray over him, anointing him with oil in the name of the Lord, and the prayer of the
faith shall save him." Epistle of St. James, 5:14, 15 (King James version).
3 Mitchell v. Davis, 205 S.W.2d 812 (Tex., 1947); State v. Barnes, 141 Tenn. 469, 212
S.W. 100 (1919); Wallace v. Cox, 136 Tenn. 69, 188 S.W. 611 (1916); Owens v. State,
6 Okla. Crim. 110, 116 Pac. 345 (1911); State v. Chenoweth, 163 Ind. 94, 71 N.E. 197
(1904); Regina v. Anstan, [1893) 17 Cox. C. C. 602.

DE PAUL LAW REVIEW

classified as a necessity. 4 A breach of this duty may result in a conviction
for homicide. While the indictment usually includes murder, a finding
of involuntary manslaughter based upon culpable negligence is generally the result. 5 The earliest English case so holding was Regina v.
Smith,6 in which a master was found guilty of manslaughter for his failure
to provide medicines to an apprentice. Several states have passed statutes
which codify the common law duty of furnishing medical cure but many7
of these statutes are the basis of a misdemeanor rather than manslaughter.
Where the lack of medical attention is a result of parental neglect, the
courts have had little difficulty in disposing of the case.8 However, when
the case deals with otherwise attentive parents whose religious philosophies account for their failure to provide assistance which results in
prosecution for criminal neglect, the courts have had great difficulty in
applying both the common law and its statutory equivalent.
Religious belief as guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States is not an absolute right.
It is the right to worship as one pleases, but does not extend to practices
inconsistent with the safety or peace of the state which includes the
protection of the lives and health of its children.9 In Reynolds v. United
States,10 the court held that a party's religious belief cannot be accepted
as a justification for his committing an overt act made criminal by the
law of the land. 1 The Court further stated that to hold otherwise would
be to permit every citizen to become a law unto himself whereupon
government could exist only in name. It is quite clear that no man can
be permitted to set up his religious belief as a defense to the breach of
12
a duty, when such neglect is clearly a violation of the law of the state.
13
In the leading case of People v. Pierson which involved a conviction
of a parent whose defense was a belief in divine healing, the court held
4 State v. Chenoweth, 163 Ind. 94,71 N.E. 197 (1904); People v. Pierson, 176 N.Y. 201,

68 N.E. 243 (1903); Regina v. Smith, [1837] 8 Cur. & P. 153.
5 E.g., State v. Barnes, 141 Tenn. 469, 212 S.W. 100 (1919).
6 [1837] 8 Cur. & P. 153.
7 E.g., N.Y. Penal Code 482 (Supp., 1959) provides: "A person who, wilfully omits,
who is able to do so, or without lawful excuse, to perform a duty by law imposed upon
him to furnish food, clothing, shelter or medical or surgical attendance to a minor....
s E.g., Stehr v. State, 92 Neb. 755, 139 N.W. 676 (1913).
9 Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145
(1878); People v. Pierson, 176 N.Y. 201, 68 N.E. 243 (1903).
10 98 U.S. 145 (1878).

11 Ibid.
12 E.g., Mitchell v. Davis, 205 S.W.2d 812 (Tex., 1947); People v. Pierson, 176 N.Y.
201, 68 N.E. 243 (1903).
13 176 N.Y. 201, 68 N.E. 243 (1903).
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that such a statute being directed at the acts and not the beliefs of individuals, and involving the prevention of a public wrong was clearly
a valid exercise of the police power of the state. 14 The court went on to
say:
We place no limitations upon the power of the mind over the body, the

power of faith to dispel disease or the power of the Supreme Being
to heal the
15
sick. We merely declare the law as given us by the legislature.
The state, as parens patriae, may legislate for the protection of children. 16 Further, it has been held that the term "medical attendance" as
used in a statute holding a parent criminally liable for the neglect of
furnishing such aid to a child is attendance by a duly licensed physician,
and not one who, because of his religious belief, believes in divine heal17
ing accomplished by prayer.
In considering a homicide caused by parental omission in furnishing
medicines, the English courts have disposed of cases involving religious
overtones and those purely of neglect in the same manner. The result
has been conviction for manslaughter.18 In Regina v. Senior,19 the court
held that, though a father's religious scruples may be against such aid,
a failure to provide medical care amounted to neglect, which was the
basis of a conviction of manslaughter. The American courts have not
treated cases involving religious overtones the same as those involving
other parental neglect. While the courts have repeatedly handed down
convictions of manslaughter for parents who simply neglect to provide
medical treatment for their children, 20 a diligent search has failed to turn
up one higher court conviction involving a manslaughter indictment of
parents whose religious philosophies have caused their failure in furnishing medical assistance to a seriously ill child. Yet, as in the case of State v.
Chenowetb,21 where the court refused to decide the question because of
the record on appeal, the common law doctrine of parental liability has
been affirmed and the defense of religious belief denied. Further, numerous convictions for misdemeanors based upon statutes have repeatedly
14 See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944); Mitchell v. Davis, 205 S.W.2d
812 (Tex., 1947); Owens v. State, 6 Okla. Crim. 122, 116 Pac. 345 (1911); State v. Chenoweth, 163 Ind. 94, 71 N.E. 197 (1904).
15 176 N.Y. 201, 68 N.E. 243, 247 (1903).
16 Mitchell v. Davis, 205 S.W.2d 812 (Tex., 1947); People v. Pierson, 176 N.Y. 201,
68 N.E. 243 (1903).
17 People v. Pierson, 176 N.Y. 201, 68 N.E. 243 (1903).
18 Queen v. Senior, [1899] 1 Q.B. 283; Reg. v. Cook, [1898] 62 J.P. 715.
19 [1899] 1 Q.B. 283.
20
E.g., Stehr v. State, 92 Neb. 755, 139 N.W. 676 (1913).
21 163 Ind. 94, 71 N.E. 197 (1904).
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denied the religion as a defense. 22 There are two frequently quoted lower
court decisions which held parents who believed in divine healing guilty
of involuntary manslaughter for the death of their minor child. The first
of these is Commonwealth v. Hoffman 23 in which it appears that the
child died of scarlet fever and the real issue presented to the jury was the
protection of society from a contagious disease. Indeed, the court instructed the jury that the case in no sense whatever involved a question
of Christian faith or of the efficacy of prayer, but was rather a question
of the State's policy to protect society and regulate medicine. The instruction to the jury was as follows:
If, however, the theory upon which the defense in this case rests be correct,
then this policy of our state is wholly a mistake and its legislation along the
line of that policy a superfluity .... The question raised by this defense is one

in which every community is interested. No man liveth to himself alone and
no man dietb to himself. The danger of a contagious disease of the nature of
24
scarlet fever lies at the very foundation of our system of quarantine ....
In the case of Commonwealth v. Bretb 2 5 it appears that the defendant, further, stated that he did not disbelieve in medicine, but believed that it was not essential. The court distinguished this case from
those where the defendant disbelieves at all times and under all circumstances in the use of medicine, though it does appear that the defendant
did believe in divine healing, he also felt that medicine would have been
26
beneficial to his child.
The lack of manslaughter convictions in American courts is the result
of a justifiedly sympathetic feeling for those whose religious philosophy
has caused their plight. Further, the American courts have had to wait
and resolve the religious question in the light of our Constitution, where
the English courts had long resolved the problem. The obvious desire
27
for an acquittal is best illustrated in the case of Bradley v. Florida
where the court in resolving the question of causation stated that the
definition of manslaughter contained in the statute does not cover such
a case,28 since it was not fairly proved that any "culpable negligence" of
the father caused the killing of the child. The court's reasoning being
22 Beck v. State, 290 Okla. Crim. 240, 233 Pac. 495 (1925); State v. Barnes, 141 Tenn.
469, 212 S.W. 100 (1919); Owens v. State, 6 Okla. Crim. 122, 116 Pac. 345 (1911); People

v. Pierson, 176 N.Y. 201, 68 N.E. 243 (1903).
2329 Pa. Co. Ct. 65 (1903).

24 Ibid., at 72.
2544

Pa. Co. Ct. 56 (1915).

20 The

record does not disclose an appeal for either Hoffman or Breth.
79 Fla. 651, 84 So. 677 (1920).
28 Fla. Gen. Stat. (1906) S3209; the statute made the killing of a human being by the
act, procurement, or culpable negligence of another, a felony called manslaughter.
27
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that the death of the child was caused by the accidental burning in which
the father had no part; and that the absence of medical attention did not
cause "the killing" of the child even if the failure or refusal of the father
to provide medical attention was "culpable negligence." And again in the
Beck case, while the court affirmed the conviction of a misdemeanor, it
held the punishment excessive and modified it by taking off the jail
sentence and leaving a $50 fine. It appears that the child died of lockjaw.
In the Craig case, the court followed the majority view in denying
religion as a defense, but held that the evidence was not sufficient to
establish the element of causation. The evidence presented, which gave
the appellate court its problem was the testimony of medical witnesses
called to give expert opinions. The principal question put to them was
whether or not appropriate treatment would have resulted in recovery.
The response to this was that if appropriate treatment had been given
soon enough and if the patient responded, an excellent chance of recovery
would have been had. The court's answer was that since parents have a
reasonable discretion in when to call in medical aid, and that since
nothing in the testimony would sustain a finding that the parents were
negligent during the early period of the disease, causation had not been
proven. The court further considered that the doctors stated that, at the
last stages of the illness, a cure would have probably been ineffectual. Yet,
the record discloses that the child had extensive pneumonia of both lungs
in an advanced state, with a complication of acute suppurative arthritis
in the elbow joint and some hemorrhage in the adrenals. It was further
shown that the child was ill for eighteen days before its death.
It would appear, from what has been said, that though religion is held
not to be a defense, that it is nevertheless the best defense. If this is not
so, then why is it that the courts expect such exactness of medical science
in a case involving religious overtones and not in one of pure negligence.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-STATE ALLOWED PEREMPTORY
CHALLENGE OF PREVIOUSLY ACCEPTED JUROR AFTER
DEFENSE EXHAUSTED PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES
The defendant was indicted for murder. During the examination on
voir dire, after the defendant had exhausted his peremptory challenges,
the prosecution asked the court to excuse a juror that had already been
accepted by both sides. The court excused this juror over the defendant's
objection. After being convicted of murder in the first degree, the defendant appealed, contending that the trial court committed error in allowing the state to excuse a juror already accepted after defendant's
peremptory challenges were exhausted. The Supreme Court of Arkansas
affirmed the judgment holding that there is no valid reason to refuse the

